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An Essay on Constitutional Design
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ABSTRACT
How should constitutional designers address the problem of apex criminality, or criminal actions
by those elected or appointed to high positions in a national government? I develop here three
general points about this difficult question of constitutional design. First, it is not at all clear that
a constitutional designer ought to expend effort on creating accountability mechanisms to address
apex criminality. Second, if a designer does choose to address the question, she must opt between
two necessarily imperfect options—a ‘legal’ mechanism embedded in a nonpartisan body such as a
prosecutor’s office, or a ‘political’ mechanism, which runs through an elected body such as a legislature.
There is no simple response to the question of which is optimal. Third, a better way to approach the
constitutional design question may be to anticipate the kinds of political culture that will likely unfold
under a new constitution. Even if a designer cannot easily optimize some single metric of national
welfare, she can make an intelligent judgment about the character of political life she hopes to inspire.
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INTRODUCTION
How should a constitutional designer address the risk of criminal acts by
elected or appointed figures at the very apex of government? Is there an optimal
means by which allegations of what might be called apex criminality can be
investigated and sanctioned? Or instead, is it more sensible for a constitutional
designer to say nothing about the problem at all? These questions resonate in
both new democracies and in polities undergoing constitutional reform after
periods of misrule. Even for established constitutional democracies, these
questions might usefully be considered as a way to prime our intuitions about
subconstitutional design choices. At a minimum, they might clarify the range
of normative considerations that should inform judgments about extant
institutions: To what extent do they successfully respond to the problems they
are meant to solve? And what externalities do they engender?
My aim here is to illuminate the choices that a constitutional designer
must work through in deciding whether and how to address apex criminality. I
want to frame the question as a general one, an issue of constitutional design in
the abstract rather than an inquiry into specifically U.S. constitutional law, for
two reasons. First, the question of whether there is an optimal response to apex
criminality is in practice a general one. It is a mistake to think that the United
States has some kind of monopoly on shoddy leaders or the best institutional
devices to deal with them. In 2017 alone, a policing scandal engulfed the Fine
Gael Deputy Prime Minister in Eire; in France, a tax avoidance and corruption
imbroglio undermined the center-right presidential candidate’s polling edge;
and in Brazil, the National Congress started impeachment proceedings for
alleged financial improprieties against its second president in a year. And this is
not even to mention the questions swirling around the White House related to
inexplicable kowtowing to Russian autocrats, tides of foreign emoluments,
silenced adult film actresses, or mysterious videotapes of cavorting Slavic sex
workers. Apex criminality is a pervasive problem that demands a general
answer.
Second, the U.S. Constitution is surprisingly opaque as to how apex
criminality should be addressed. The resulting debates have been colored by
partisan and institutional bias, or have tended to become inconclusively mired
in the murk of conflicting original public understandings, historical glosses,
and institutional self-dealing. Consider just one question to illustrate this.
Article II identifies the possibility of impeachment for presidents and other
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senior officials.1 But the Constitution’s text does not state that impeachment is
the only means of removing a senior elected or appointed official. So are
alternative paths possible? At best, the scholarly answer to the question of
whether impeachment leaves space for alternative mechanisms has been a
“tentative ‘no.’”2 But is this answer trustworthy? Even a casual glance at the
literature reveals the dominance of lawyerly voices from within the executive
branch.3 Such voices can hardly be taken to be neutral arbiters of a question
that bears directly on the authority and tenure of their bosses. More
independent analysts, indeed, reach rather different outcomes.4 Whatever the
correct answer, the debate as a whole has not generated clarity or light.
In any event, I read the American debate on how to deal with apex
criminality as too narrowly focused on rather ineffable questions of whether
one should draw a negative inference from the specific text of Article II, or
whether to construe a historical practice dominated by self-interested, partisan
actors as conclusive of constitutional meaning. It is not hard to spin creative
readings of materials from the Founding period to reach sharply divergent
results. I rather doubt, though, that any claim about what the Constitution really
“means” can help us understand how institutions will in fact behave, especially
given the marked shift in political-party dynamics in Congress between 1789
and 2018. In short, the kind of inquiries stimulated by the U.S. constitutional
materials, and pursued in much current scholarship, get us no closer, in my
view, to an understanding of how appropriately to deal with the hard and
enduring problem of how to address apex criminality.
In what follows, I offer instead three general points by reasoning from first
principles of institutional design. These points are best understood as
hypotheses rather than firm conclusions about how to deal with apex
criminality. By working from explicit, logical premises, and by clearly laying
the empirical predicates of each step of the argument, I hope to avoid reliance
on the controversial jurisprudential and normative grounds that infest the U.S.
debate. I hope to instead develop a more general sense of how constitutional
design might address apex criminality.

1.
2.
3.
4.

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”).
Ken Gormley, Commentary, Impeachment and the Independent Counsel: A
Dysfunctional Union, 51 STAN. L. REV. 309, 315 (1999).
See, e.g., id. (citing numerous executive branch lawyers).
Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Interaction Between Impeachment and the Independent Counsel
Statute, 86 GEO. L.J. 2193, 2227–28 (1998) (distinguishing between impeachment and
criminal prosecution, and concluding that the former does not preclude the latter).
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The first claim developed below is a bit counterintuitive: A rational
constitutional designer might decide to remain silent on questions of apex
criminality. The core intuition here is that most instances in which apex criminality imposes truly massive costs cannot be mitigated by formal constitutional
rules. My second claim is that the basic choice facing constitutional designers is
one between legal mechanisms, which involve apolitical expert bodies such as
prosecutors’ offices, political mechanisms, which run through elected bodies
such as legislatures, or some mix of the two. Neither the corner solutions nor
any mix of both legal and political mechanisms, however, is obviously optimal.
There are risks all around. Finally, I suggest that a constitutional designer can
usefully be guided by asking what kind of political culture, or “project,” she
wishes to seed through her constitutional design.5 It should be the pursuit of
that bespoke project, I think, that should guide our constitutional designer
more than any simple notion of optimal design.
This means that, at least in the compass of this paper, I offer no judgment
about “what is to be done” about President Trump. As of mid–2018, the
creation and working of a special counsel to investigate the Trump campaign
and the Trump White House6 had sparked a lively, if predictably bimodal,
debate about the merits of different modes of accountability. Careful analysts
have recognized the inevitable interaction of legal and political channels.7 Less
nuanced voices seemed to reject, almost wholesale, any formalized process
except for impeachment outside of very rare scenarios (which, in any event,
would depend on information that would be very unlikely to come to public
attention without a formalized process).8 The question of institutional choice

5.

6.

7.

8.

I borrow the term “project” from the great philosopher Bernard Williams. J.C.C. SMART
& BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR & AGAINST 110–12 (1993). In the passage
that I have in mind, Williams criticizes the implicit psychology of utilitarianism by
pointing out its inability to account for the “vast range of projects” that humans pursue
beyond and instead of the pursuit of aggregate happiness. Id. at 112. Following
Williams, I think it is more sensible here to think about what kind of “project” a
constitution entails than to think about how to maximize, say, national welfare.
See Devlin Barrett et al., Deputy Attorney General Appoints Special Counsel to Oversee Probe
of Russian Interference in Election, WASH. POST (May 18, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/world/national-security/deputy-attorney-general-appoints-special-counsel-tooversee-probe-of-russian-interference-in-election/2017/05/17/302c1774-3b49-11e78854-21f359183e8c_story.html [https://perma.cc/7AMH-BW6M].
See, e.g., Bob Bauer, Opinion, Why Team Trump Needs to Lay off the Mueller Probe, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 11, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/opinion/trump-muellerprobe.html (discussing the reliance of congressional inquiries on the evidentiary
production of investigations within the Justice Department).
See Alan M. Dershowitz, Opinion, When Politics Is Criminalized, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/28/opinion/politics-investigations-trump-russia.html.
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raised by these debates, however, is not the one that I aim to pursue here
directly. If there was a moment at which the U.S. could have adopted a welltailored constitutional response to apex criminality, that moment has long
passed. There is no plausible way that an optimal institutional structure could
be adopted in the midst of l’affaire russe. In consequence, the question in the
U.S. context is how best to muddle along with our antediluvian constitutional
text. Even if the latter did speak clearly, there is no reason to think that it distills
any particular wisdom to illuminate the current situation. Probably the best
that can be hoped for in the current U.S. context is a modicum of commitment
to democratic norms, and a smidgeon of shame about overt criminality, on the
part of key congressional and executive leaders. It is sadly telling that even this
rather modest hope is probably unrealistic.
I.

THE PROBLEM OF APEX CRIMINALITY

My central aim here is to think through whether a wise constitutional
designer would opt for legal or political instruments to deal with apex
criminality. This quandary of procedural choice, however, is closely entangled
with questions about the substance of criminal regulation that covers high-level
elected officials. That is, one might want to start by defining what counts as
apex criminality before explaining how it is to be investigated or prosecuted.
But I do not think this definitional move is in fact necessary. I start by
explaining why.
If one were to judge by the American debates, the relegation of substantive
law would hardly seem obvious. In that context, there is an active debate on
whether it is just some subset of presidential “high” crimes that warrants
investigation and punishment, and whether there is a different and distinct
class of “maladministration” that does not.9 One possible inference is that any
judgment about the processes used for addressing apex criminality must start
with a view about the exact nature and scope of the acts to be regulated.
In my view, there are reasons to think that substance need not precede
process. There is, on the one hand, a deep-seated tendency in American legal
thought to focus upon second-order questions of institutional choice (“who
decides”) in lieu of first-order questions of how primary conduct should be
regulated (“what should be decided”). This approach is most commonly

9.

See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 MINN. L. REV. 347, 349–51
(2010) (offering as a criterion for impeachment a class of “assassinable offenses”). On
the English practice of impeachment for maladministration, see Note, The Scope of the
Power to Impeach, 84 YALE L.J. 1316, 1326 (1975).
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associated with the Legal Process school.10 A Legal Process scholar might point
out that it makes sense to start with institutional choice, because doing so
brackets the hardest normative questions. She would suggest that by attending
to a domain of relatively abstract, technocratic choices first, consensus is more
likely to be achieved. Further, she might note, it makes sense to start by asking
what instruments one has at hand, so that one can make a judgment about what
kinds of criminality can and should be addressed.
Even if one is skeptical of the Legal Process appeal to apolitical,
technocratic neutrality, there is a second, and I think better, argument for
attending to institutional choice rather than substance. Contra the Legal
Process assumption, the question of what primary conduct by an apex official
falls outside criminal bounds is more tractable and less contentious than it might
first appear. At least from a constitutional designer’s perspective, it might not
warrant attention simply because it is so easy to solve through ordinary politics.
Start with the general part of the criminal law. Few, I hope, would happily
endorse an elected head of government or head of state who, say, openly and
notoriously committed murder on New York’s Fifth Avenue, or for that matter
larceny, manslaughter, or sexual assault.11 Elective office should not be a ticket
for gross criminality, and it would seem to be common ground that such
serious felonies ought to be punishable even when committed by senior elected
or appointed actors.
Perhaps the best argument that might be mustered against this judgment
about the scope of appropriate liability turns on the risk that an elected official
will respond to the risk of prosecution by declining to leave office at all. In some
jurisdictions, for example, elected leaders use their political authority to undo
term limits that are intended to prevent individuals from entrenching
themselves in power.12 In other jurisdictions, where there are no meaningful
10.
11.

12.

See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Commentary, The Making of The Legal
Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2031, 2044–45 (1994) (introducing the institutional
focus of the “legal process school”).
But consider here the case of President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, who has
proudly proclaimed that he had “personally pulled the trigger and killed three people as
mayor of Davao City.” Russell Goldman, ‘I Cannot Lie,’ Rodrigo Duterte Says,
Confirming He Did Kill People as Mayor, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/world/asia/philippines-rodrigo-duterteconfirms-killings-davao.html. Consider also that, as of this writing, it is not Duterte,
but the Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court who faces impeachment for
resisting his policies. Felipe Villamor, She Stood Up to Duterte. Now She Faces
Impeachment, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/world/
asia/philippines-chief-justice-duterte.html.
See, e.g., Jina Moore, Uganda Lifts an Age Limit, Paving the Way for a President for Life,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/world/africa/uganda-
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elections, there is some evidence to suggest that leaders are less likely to depart
peacefully when they reasonably expect to be prosecuted in an international
court after the fact.13 These are nontrivial concerns, but it is hardly clear they
warrant doing away with criminal prohibitions for high-level officials. Indeed,
one might have the contrary worry that if elective office was packaged with a
license to violate serious criminal laws, that fact alone might lead to officials
declining to leave office at the end of their terms. Given these countervailing
risks, I will simply assume for now that there is no substantial risk of
entrenchment beyond term limits for fear of future prosecution: Much of the
familiar criminal law of serious felonies, absent that risk, should therefore apply
to apex officials’ conduct.
Beyond serious felonies, there is also a class of criminal offenses for which
the possession and the misuse of official power are a sine qua non. Bribery,
insofar as it involves the solicitation or receipt of unlawful gratuities, is an
example of an offense that (in one form) can only be committed by an official.14
It is possible to imagine an argument that a high-level official, such as a
president, is inherently exempt from such regulation on the ground that action
taken under official authority is ipso facto legal.15 The argument might be that
the very definition of her powers is without bounds, so she is entitled to take
official actions for any reason, including a bad reason, without repercussions.
Recent deployments of the “unitary president” logic in the United States
sometimes have that flavor to them.
It is tough to see why such arguments should have much normative
traction. Why should it be lawful for a head of state to take bribes or cultivate
foreign emoluments, given that the social harm posed by such bribes is at its

13.

14.
15.

president-museveni-age-limit.html. For an empirical study of presidential efforts to
evade term limits, see Tom Ginsburg et al., On the Evasion of Executive Term Limits, 52
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1807 (2011).
For evidence that the creation of the International Criminal Court has dampened the
willingness of certain national leaders to relinquish power, see Daniel Krcmaric, Should
I Stay or Should I Go? Leaders, Exile, and the Dilemmas of International Justice, 62 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 499 (2018).
18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2012) (bribery of public officials).
This seems to be Alan Dershowitz’s position, although he describes the receipt of bribes
as beyond the president’s authority. Isaac Chotiner, An Argument With Alan
Dershowitz, SLATE (Dec. 4, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
interrogation/2017/12/an_interview_with_alan_dershowitz_on_trump_and_the_muell
er_investigation.html [https://perma.cc/7W33-VMGL]. I am not convinced this
distinction is a tenable one. For example, imagine a president who concededly uses a
“constitutional authority” (for example, the power to instruct his subordinates) as a quid
pro quo for sexual favors from a subordinate. That person, on Dershowitz’s definition,
is immune from penalty—a result that seems quite unappealing to me.
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acme when a head of state is involved? Why should their official actions, when
taken with culpable motives, be immune from scrutiny or punishment? It is
positively bizarre to suggest that officials lack bad motives, or that those bad
motives have not had harmful effects on good government.
One might also appeal to the possibility of retrospective voting as a cure
for this sort of behavior for elected officials, which does not exist for lowerranked officials. But it requires rather heroic assumptions to reach the
conclusion that an elected official willing to bribe or abuse her powers would
not also do her utmost to obfuscate her culpability. We should instead expect
her to throw the shadow of blame on her political opponents, and to deploy
dark instruments (including bribery of her own) to anchor her popular
legitimacy. Absent an “unbundled”16 franchise in which voters can express
judgments about discrete governmental functions, it is therefore quite hard to
see the allure of an exclusive reliance on retrospective voting as a cure for
bribery or similar kinds of self-dealing.
In short, I think it is reasonably clear that apex officials should be
amenable to punishment for serious felonies and crimes such as bribery, which
involve the abuse of official power. The definition of apex criminality’s
substance may be simple enough that there is no need to spend much time
analyzing it.
II.

HOW SHOULD CONSTITUTIONS ADDRESS APEX CRIMINALITY?

It would be too quick to move from this point to the further, separate
conclusion that a constitutional designer should address the question of apex
criminality in her text. Instead, and perhaps surprisingly, it might well be
sensible for our designer to refrain from including any particular procedural
solution in the text. This would leave the matter open to subsequent
deliberation and resolution through the ordinary processes of politics. Where a
constitution is democratic in orientation, this might mean that either relatively
stable institutions emerge or that ad hoc responses to allegations rise and fall
depending on transient local political conjunctures. While my focus here is on
democratic constitutionalism, it is worth noting that silence in an authoritarian

16.

Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 VA. L. REV. 301, 304 (2010) (characterizing the
“unbundled powers alternative” as one in which “[m]ultiple branches exercis[e]
combined functions in topically limited domains”).
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constitution might reasonably be read differently as a signal of de facto or de
jure immunity from ordinary criminal laws for apex figures.17
Lest the prospect of an ad hoc solution seems implausible, we might take a
fresh look at the 1787 text of the U.S. Constitution. As I have already noted, that
text mentions impeachment without offering a precise or lucid account of its
substantive bounds, let alone of whether it implicitly precludes the possibility of
a parallel criminal prosecution.18 Nor does the text define the criminal
immunities of senior executive branch officials in the same way that it
delineates the analog immunity of national legislators in the Speech and Debate
Clause.19 To be sure, the U.S. Department of Justice concluded in 1973, and
then reaffirmed in 2000, that “neither the text nor the history of the
Constitution” settles the question of whether there is a singular right way to
investigate and punish criminal acts by a sitting president.20 But, again, to what
extent should conclusions of executive branch lawyers be seen as being free of
the executive branch’s institutional interests? I am skeptical that their inquiry,
as styled, has a simple right answer. It is always possible to plumb the archives,
the antiquarian dictionaries, and the Kuiper Belt of analogic reasoning and
intertextual inference to conclude that there is, in fact, a definitive answer to be
had in the constitutional text. But this sort of enterprise seems to me to rest on
the heroic but implausible assumption that the relevant legal materials, if held
at just the right angle in just the right autumnal light, will refract out one correct
answer. That is a claim better suited to the seminary than the law school.
Better, I think, to acknowledge that textual oversight and ambiguity yield
no magic bullet, but reveal a long historical wobbling between congressional
investigation, impeachment, independent counsel, and special counsel. With
this in view, it is possible to see that the U.S. Constitution effectively left open the
question of how and when apex officials can be punished for their serious
criminal acts. Subsequent generations have filled in that gap with a variety of
interpretations, and it is a mistake to think that any one answer to the question
is “right” or “final.” One might further think that the combination of
17.

18.
19.
20.

But not necessarily. Even tyrants need to coordinate teams of subordinates, in part by
making credible commitments, which might be supported by accountability
mechanisms. For a terrific illustration of this point using Joseph Stalin’s subordinates as
a case study, see SHEILA FITZPATRICK, ON STALIN’S TEAM: THE YEARS OF LIVING
DANGEROUSLY IN SOVIET POLITICS 1–14 (2015).
For an effort to gloss the rich complexities of the Constitution’s text on impeachment,
see CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 25–52 (1974) (analyzing scope
of impeachment under Article II).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney Gen., A Sitting President’s Amenability to
Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 OPINIONS OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 222, 236 (2000).
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constitutional silence and ad hoc resolution has to date not been disastrous for
the United States (even if it is exceedingly difficult to see how the history can be
seen as exemplary, or a model for others to emulate).
Even if allegations of high-level criminality are ubiquitous, and even if
some fraction are credible, that still does not mean the constitutional text must
have a firm and clear answer to the question of how they are addressed. A
constitutional designer might reasonably conclude that she has bigger fish to
fry. If she is sufficiently uncertain about the likely downstream negative
consequences of any given accountability mechanism, she may decide it is
better to leave the criminality well enough alone. Avoiding an unintentional
catalysis of catastrophic outcomes is, I have argued elsewhere, an entirely
plausible touchstone of constitutional design.21 Constitutional creation,
moreover, often requires a delicate braiding of extant vested interests with an
impulse toward transformation, a task that leaves little room for the
consideration of uncertain, contingent future travails. Our designer might
reasonably think her time and efforts are better spent on the task of resolving
the immediate pressing problems that motivated a constitution’s adoption,
rather than on a distant and abstract possibility of future defalcations.
The point can be made more forcefully still: Our reasonable constitutional
designer might say to herself that apex criminality is not a catastrophic
outcome, and perhaps not even a very important one. Drawing on recent
experience, she might observe that discrete instances of high-level criminality
may be “relatively trivial” and as such may not impose significant social costs.22
Would it endanger La République française if, for example, Penelope Fillon had
indeed been overpaid as a parliamentary assistant? What really is the
importance of at least some of President Trump’s various and sundry mooted
criminalities and petty illegalities? Would it matter now if he had conspired to
violate the Logan Act,23 or had obstructed justice in violation of federal law by,
among other things, firing the director of the FBI? The president has already
been discernably candid in welcoming Russian interference and in
affirmatively embracing the self-dealing (and perhaps “corrupt[]”24) reasons for
firing James Comey, and yet political life seems to tick on in its usual way.
Institutions of criminal justice seem neither paralyzed nor irrevocably
corrupted by that sight. A cynic might say that when a nation’s political culture

21.
22.
23.
24.

See Aziz Z. Huq, Hippocratic Constitutional Design, in ASSESSING CONSTITUTIONAL
PERFORMANCE 39 (Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Z. Huq eds., 2016).
Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 GEO. L.J. 2267, 2270–71 (1998).
18 U.S.C. § 953 (2012).
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2012).
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is already endemically characterized by lies, culpable omissions, or gross
negligence with respect to the factual predicates of one’s claims, then even
candidly confessed apex criminality will not be terribly significant. It may
instead be but one of a host of more pressing concerns, and certainly not one
that plainly warrants a constitutional response.
This somewhat jaundiced view of political life might seek succor from
the thought that lies and rotten deals are not merely incidental to
democratic political life. They are one of its necessary components. “No
one succeeds in politics without getting his hands dirty,” or so the
conventional wisdom since Sartre, Weber, and Machiavelli, goes.25 Private
vices do not always cash out into infirmities of state. Instead, as Michael Walzer
has suggested, they are a necessary part of the daily fabric of political life in a
world characterized by conflicts between competing moral values.26
But are not the consequences of apex criminality sufficiently bad to justify
some kind of constitutional prophylaxis? One could point to the hecatombs
flowing from state violence in the twentieth and early twenty-first century, and
demand apex accountability devices to forestall their repetition. But great
crimes are more often committed through the state than against the state.
From the Japanese American internment to the Red Scare, most serious
incursions on human wellbeing have been executed by the state as state policy
with the enthusiastic support of much of the populace.27 The mechanisms for
the redress of apex criminality will rarely be well-fitted to the task of parrying or
responding to mass atrocity done for reasons of state. Because such crimes are
commonly executed by political and legal institutions acting with hearty
popular support, mechanisms for the redress of mundane criminality will crack
and splinter before yielding results, providing no prophylactic at all. A separate
debate must therefore be had about how such horrors are to be held at bay, or
redressed after the terrible fact.
Even if there is no compulsion to address apex criminality, it cannot be
said that the endeavor is frivolous or slight. Scale matters to official
criminality’s significance: The occasional crime, iterated often enough,
becomes an epidemic that can threaten the public’s trust in the state and its
25.

26.
27.

Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
160, 164 (1973). For a useful genealogy of this idea, see C.A.J. Coady, The Problem of
Dirty Hands, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta et al. eds.,
rev. ed. 2014) (2009), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/dirty-hands.
Walzer, supra note 25, at 165 (giving the example of a “candidate [who] must make a
deal with a dishonest ward boss” in order to secure office).
For a brilliant synopsis of this point, see JONATHAN GLOVER, HUMANITY: A MORAL
HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 1–10 (2001).
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sense of institutional legitimacy.28 Although the antique U.S. Constitution is
unclear as to the appropriate response to apex criminality, more recent
constitutions typically adopt ombudsmen, anticorruption agencies, or other
bespoke devices to mitigate the risk that high-level officials misbehave. Today,
data from the Comparative Constitutions Project suggest the modal
constitution now has four such independent bodies of one form or another
denominated as ombudsmen or the like.29 For example, Chapter IX of South
Africa’s Constitution provides a set of state institutions supporting
constitutional democracy, including the Public Protector (a sort of
ombudsman); a Human Rights Commission to promote and protect human
rights; a Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Cultural, Religious,
and Linguistic Communities; a Commission for Gender Equality; an AuditorGeneral; and an Independent Electoral Commission.30 That the dominant
trend in constitution-writing today is toward legal rather than political
responses to apex criminality, though, should not foreclose further inquiry.
The mere existence of such bodies does not imply their sound operation, nor
foreclose the existence of superior institutional alternatives.
One argument in favor of addressing apex criminality in the constitutional
text might proceed along the following lines. The important consequences of apex
criminality do not necessarily adhere in the grubby particulars of one person’s
offense. We do not, and should not, intrinsically care about President Trump’s
financial or sexual misadventures, any more than we should have cared about
President Clinton’s. But like pebbles cast across placid waters, discrete
instances of apex malfeasance, and the public’s responses to them, may have
consequences of a more systemic character and, hence, are of greater interest to
a constitutional designer than their immediate profile would have suggested.
One possibility is a sort of “demonstration effect” in which high-level figures
model the operative bases of allegiance and reward through their misconduct,
providing a model for subordinates and those seeking a share of resources or
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political power.31 We might worry, as Adam Samaha has explained in an
insightful essay, about “[a]ppearance driving reality.”32
A worry that apex lawbreaking will be taken as exemplary in this fashion,
rather than exceptional, might explain the enduring appeal of A.V. Dicey’s
seminal formulation of the “rule of law.”33 One of the several definitions that
Dicey offered requires “the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law
of the land administered by the Ordinary Law Courts,” and excludes
categorically the possibility of any “exemption of officials or others from the
duty of obedience to the law which governs other citizens or from the
jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals.”34 This is a requirement that officials not
only be responsible before the same law as citizens, it is a demand that they be
responsible in a particular way. Dicey’s test for the rule of law assumes that the
relevant institutions will be “tribunals.” This assumes that there will be legal
rather than political mechanisms of apex accountability. At the time Dicey
wrote, though, the highest court in the United Kingdom was drawn from the
ranks of the House of Lords. Rather than a claim about necessary institutional
separations, I read Dicey to be making an argument about the qualities of
regularity, parity, evenhandedness, and singularity of forum through which the
criminal law is enforced. I also read him to recommend that such
accountability be rendered by quintessentially legal rather than political means.
A reasonable constitutional designer, then, is under no compulsion to
address apex criminality in her text. Recent constitutional design experience,
however, suggests that many other constitutional designers see reason to do so
(although there is not much scholarship on how the resulting institutional
choices have worked out). It is possible to discern powerful reasons for doing
so which are rooted in a very foundational understanding of the rule of law.
The balance of evidence, in my view, thus makes it more than plausible, albeit
not necessary, to address apex criminality in the text of a constitution.

31.
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III.

APEX ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE FORMS OF DEMOCRATIC
POLITICAL LIFE

Another difficult predicate question, though, awaits: What exactly do we
mean when we ask for a “superior” system of apex accountability? That is, what
exactly should the design of accountability institutions strive to do well? And
how can they fail? The question implies some totting up of costs and benefits—
but it is hardly clear from the question’s face that we know what counts as a
cost, and what counts as a benefit. For reasons developed below, I think it
would be a mistake to analyze this design choice in strictly welfarist terms.
Instead, I think it is more useful to think about apex accountability institutions
in terms of the kind of democratic political life or political culture one wants to
foster. To develop this point, I will first explain why familiar welfarist criteria
are unhelpful. Then, I will explain what I do think is worth attending to by
explaining how a constitutional designer might strive to elicit a certain kind of
domestic political life or, stated otherwise, a distinctive constitutional project.
One starting point for thinking about how to design mechanisms to
address apex criminality is found in law-and-economics-inflected
scholarship, which generally focuses on the maximization of social welfare.
But it need not have this focus. Like other kinds of consequentialism,
welfarism does need not to be operationalized through a command to
maximize some metric. It might also be pursued, among other strategies, for
example, through a “maximin” strategy that is organized around the idea that
we should focus on mitigating the potential “bad” states of the world as much as
possible. And welfare need not be the sole element of human relations being
valued.
But while it seems right to me to direct inquiry toward the expected state
of the world once a particular constitutional design is adopted, a simple
welfarist framing is not all that helpful here, or perhaps more generally in
respect to constitutional design.35 A first difficulty arises in the deep, perhaps
insurmountable, problems of writing down a social welfare function for a
complex society characterized by large variation in background entitlements and
innate capabilities. A second problem arises in thinking how constitutional design
can be deduced from that social welfare function. Constitutions are instruments
to manage political, military, and social risk. Even with a decent and stable
measure of social welfare in hand, a constitutional designer must assign
probabilities to political risk that, even in retrospect, can seem wildly unlikely.

35.
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(Did you anticipate in 2015 a Trump presidency allegedly propelled to power
by a social media-based Russian conspiracy? What is the risk, now that he is in
office, that Trump will decline to recognize the legitimacy of an election result
that does not run in his favor?) Without applying an extremely demanding
discount rate, it is hard to see how welfarism can plausibly be applied to
questions of complex constitutional design.
There is no reason to think that the risk of apex criminality is difficulty.
Given the potential for pervasive low-level criminality—i.e., Walzer’s dirty
hands problem36—it may be very hard to know ex ante how likely that apex
criminality will be a serious problem, or precisely what kind of problem it will
be in the medium or long term. Estimating the extent of any demonstration
effect from apex criminality, moreover, will often be very difficult.
If the basic currency of the cost-benefit calculation is elusive, a
constitutional designer must settle on something more effable. Among the
potential objects of attention in constitutional design is the question of how
institutional responses to apex criminality will affect the quality of democratic
political interaction. As the burden of accountability shifts from one
institutional foot to another, the forms through which political contestation
flows will change. This in turn will nudge the incentives, dispositions, and
preferences of officials whose careers and daily working lives are embedded in
constitutionally-shaped institutions. In this fashion, institutional choices
embedded in a constitution can have a dynamic effect on the quality of
democratic political culture.
This is not a terribly new point, at least when pitched in the abstract.
There are countless ways in which our schools, workplaces, social clubs, and
religious associations shape preferences and beliefs. From James Madison
onward, it has been thought that an important entailment of a political
institution’s design is the manner in which it nudges and tweaks the preferences
of official actors.37 In more metaphorical terms, the choice about how elective
and bureaucratic structures respond to high-level criminality matters to the
character of the national democratic project. It changes the downstream
quality of political life woven by the back-and-forth between persons,
institutions, and conventions. In particular, a constitutional design might be
concerned about the aggregate dispositions, incentives, and preferences
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brought to bear by senior political actors. Call this question one of political
culture.
Precisely what kind of national political culture is desirable—and, as
important, what kind should be sworn off—presents rather subtle questions
that are not necessarily amenable to the econometrician’s weights and
measures. Should political life be characterized by sharp, and even angry,
contestation? Or is it better served by the restraining friction of formal conventions
and expectations of mannered interaction? This is not a question with an
obvious answer.
Normative judgment matters more than empirical
measurement. Indeed, the nature and proper character of political life, and the
necessary virtues or dispositions for its successful prosecution, have been perpetual
sources of disagreement within political philosophy, with starkly different
accounts of politics being offered from the pre–Socratics onward. Thankfully,
we can hold in abeyance the most fractious of those disputes in favor of a more
localized inquiry into the character of a healthy democratic political culture. By
considering the ways in which institutional checks on apex criminality would
shape that rather more distinctive political project, we can start to grasp the
considerations that animate the institutional choice at stake here.
I think there are two main ways in which political culture might be
unhealthily distorted by mechanisms to address apex criminality. These
concern the risk of litigiousness in deliberative politics, and the potential for
politicization in rule-of-law institutions. The first concern, litigiousness,
pertains to the quality of deliberative politics conducted by elected officials in
both the legislative and executive branch. It starts from the premise that, all else
being equal, those bodies are characterized by a high degree of serious,
principled deliberation about questions that matter to the polity, and that such
deliberation yields considered judgments in the form of laws and regulations that
advance the public interest. Not only is this premise consistent with the immanent
possibility of sharp disagreement, but it also incorporates the assumption that
members of the polity disagree sharply enough about how the public good is
defined and pursued such that good-faith deliberation is needed as an
alternative to more violent confrontation.38
Institutionalized responses to apex criminality might derail beneficial
democratic deliberation in one of two ways. First, there is a risk that the policy
disagreements that are endemic to a polity will be treated as points of legal
infidelity. Rather than domesticating the polity’s endogenous conflict, the law’s
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decision to treat serious policy disagreements as a potential justification for
punishment might escalate the stakes of political disagreement. When a serious
policy dispute can be taken as evidence of constitutional infidelity, there is an
incentive for a leader’s political opponents to aggressively interpret
disagreements as grounds for removal. At the extreme, if any policy dispute
can catalyze the end of a political career, there is a risk that incumbents will use
extraconstitutional means to short-circuit policy debate. Even short of that
outcome, the temptation to treat policy divides as matters of potential criminal
liability might lead political elites to frame partisan divides as more extreme,
and more moralized matters. Their cues might induce more general divergence
in popular views. Destabilizing popular polarization will ensue if politics is not
a matter of reasonable disagreements with reasonable co-citizens, but a
demand to compromise with felons.
Concerns of this ilk are hardly farfetched. Indeed, a concern about the
transformation of policy debates into removal-oriented disputes might explain
James Madison’s objection, raised during the Philadelphia Convention debates,
to George Mason’s proposal to allow impeachment for “maladministration” as
well as high crimes and misdemeanors.39 Madison might well have been
concerned that Mason’s proposal would have transformed too many policy
debates into impeachment battles. He might have been concerned, that is,
about the transformation of policy into legal debates. The same concern is
articulated today in the United States as a concern about the “criminalization of
political differences,”40 a complaint about a putatively extreme manifestation of a
more diffuse culture of litigiousness and extreme partisanship.
A second, subtler form of this concern is that institutional design will
influence the agenda for political choice. This is a concern about substantive
questions of national policy being crowded out by “scandals that are often
imaginary and that, even if real, usually do not deserve the prominence” they
end up receiving.41 This argument hinges on the possibility that the initial
sorting rule for an accountability device generates more false positives than true
positives, but that partisan opponents of an accused figure have the incentive and
means to leverage false positives in ways that hinder effective deliberative
government. (Think here of the positions of President Clinton’s and President
Trump’s defenders.) Scandal, on this view, is merely “a tool of political
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combat,” rather than “part of a vibrant movement to reconstruct institutions.”42
Fighting about whether or not fellatio is oral sex, or whether a marginal
increase in a hotel room rate is an “emolument,” might (depending on one’s
priors about sexual intercourse or the morality of gift-giving) be examples of
false positives that have a distortive effect on the quality of democratic debate.
(Notice that the same cannot remotely be said of the question of whether
hidden coordination occurred between a presidential campaign and a foreign
sovereign in exchange for shifts in foreign policy, or whether that sovereign has
some sort of hidden influence on an apex national leader).
Concerns about litigiousness in deliberative politics, however, do not
mechanically translate into a recommendation for institutional choice. On
their face, they hinge on the potential for changes to behavior in political
institutions, rather than in prosecutors’ offices or grand jury rooms. This
would suggest that deliberative institutions should be insulated from
accountability processes in some fashion. But the same arguments can and
have been forcefully articulated against legal instruments of accountability
perceived as running amok; that is, the excessive operation of legal institutions
of accountability may distort democratic deliberation.43 This might point
toward the creation of political checks on legal mechanisms of accountability,
which is a sort of mixed strategy. Alternatively, and to my mind most
persuasively, one might infer a need for stricter acoustic separation of
accountability processes through internalized norms of professional probity
and bureaucratic regularity, regardless of their location.44
On the other side of the ledger is a concern about politicization in rule-oflaw institutions. Again, this argument has several strands. Most simply, it
presses on the principle that so long as a person has been elected to high office,
it is centrally the responsibility of the electorate to decide whether she should be
ejected from that office. Because accountability decisions necessarily implicate
the possibility that a person will complete an elective term of office, they are
necessarily political. As such, these decisions should be made by the electorate
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or, as a second best, by an “august . . . representative . . . and . . . accountable
deliberative body.”45 Purely legal mechanisms of accountability, on this view,
are a democratic malapropism.
This argument, while alluring to American ears, rings hollow in
constitutional contexts with nonelective mechanisms for enabling the transfer
of power, such as the parliamentary vote of no-confidence. The latter renders
prime ministers far more dependent on legislators’ perceptions of political
success than presidents; it hence makes them more vulnerable to the
vicissitudes of policy failure or success.46 No confidence protocols suggest that
removal mechanisms can be infused with democratic considerations without
being directly popular in character. In the United States, complaints about the
nondemocratic character of a presidential indictment on democratic grounds
ring hollow for a different reason. The elaborate and increasingly
nonmajoritarian alchemy of the Electoral College means presidents cannot
always claim a simple democratic pedigree in the first instance. And if their
selection is not purely democratic in character, it is hard to see why removal
should not also deviate from a strictly democratic norm.
An alternative objection to the use of legal, rather than political,
instruments focuses on the illicit injection of basal political considerations into
rule-of-law institutions, such as the prosecutor or the grand jury, so as to render
those institutions ineffectual or illegitimate. Even in the absence of partisan
motives—the argument would go—the power to take down high elected
officials may well prove too alluring a career-making move to be resisted by
most prosecutors. Anticipating this risk, elected officials will perceive a
powerful need to seize control of legal implements of accountability. The
resulting rush to capture the instruments of prosecution will then tend to place
great pressure upon putatively apolitical institutions. The result in extremis is a
set of prosecutorial instruments that in effect function as tools of political
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patronage. Under this system, as the Brazilian autocrat Gertulio Vargas pithily
put it, “[f]or my friends, everything; for my enemies, the law.”47
A subtler argument from politicization would hinge on the immense
discretionary authority prosecutors often have. In the American system, as in
most other jurisdictions, few instruments exist for piercing general invocations
of discretionary authority to evaluate the motives of prosecutors in particular
cases.48 Given that opacity, public trust in the bona fides of prosecutors must
rest on an alternative signal of the prosecutor’s credible commitment to the
neutral and fair-minded use of state power.49
For example, some
commentators have flagged certain ethical rules that embody “the prosecutor’s
special ethical position as a servant of the public trust.”50 To the extent that
prosecutors have ways to signal their credibility and fidelity to rule-of-law
values, though, it may be difficult for them to effectively convey these messages
when they are tasked with investigating apex criminality. If “the mass media
build[s] from every ethically questionable molehill a mountainous betrayal of
public trust,”51 for instance, prosecutors will have a hard time explaining why
they decline to prosecute. For fervent supporters of a president, conversely, any
decision to proceed with a prosecution may be ipso facto treated as evidence of
the “deep state” at work.52 As a result of these dynamics, I suspect that decisions
to investigate or prosecute apex criminality, as well as decisions not to do so,
will inevitably be construed as partisan in character. At the very least, it will
often be very difficult to prove to the public that any given decision to prosecute,
or to decline prosecution, was free of partisan influences. Prosecutors generally
will not be able to disclose sufficient information about like cases to assuage
47.
48.
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concerns about biased enforcement, given the powerful privacy interests
possessed by suspects who are not prosecuted. Trivial, and causally
inconsequential, details will be blown up and taken as damning evidence of
conspiracy. Public trust in prosecutors, and perhaps in the criminal justice
system more generally, may well wane.
The force of these worries is an empirical matter, and I make no claim
about their magnitude here. A constitutional designer, often with the same
dearth of objective data, must decide how serious each one of these concerns is
and tack accordingly in her planning. She might observe that all of these
concerns hinge in some measure on the prospect of spillovers between discrete
legal and political functions. That is, she may understand the problem as one of
motivational contamination. A logical solution to this concern is to establish
high walls between the different branches of government, and then to situate
accountability mechanisms on the correct side of the fence.
But, even assuming this is the right diagnosis, it is worth asking whether
branch-level fences are the only way to avoid having too much (criminal) law in
politics, or a surfeit of politics in law. This question is a large one that may have
no general answer, and I want to make one relatively modest point in
concluding: I want specifically to resist the inference that the right institutional
design is necessarily one that cuts sharply between the legal and political at the
branch level. This is so for three reasons of varying strength.
A first reason focuses on the strength of institutional membranes
generally as solutions to deficiencies of either incentive or disposition. There is
an impressive body of scholarship casting doubt on their use in this regard.53
Here, one might press against branch-level solutions by pointing out that both
legal and political instruments of accountability ultimately have political
foundations. The effective operation of either depends on the willingness of
pivotal political actors to support accountability given its political costs. Leon
Jaworsky’s appointment, Bill Clinton’s acquittal, and the ensuing dissolution of
the independent counsel’s statutory authorization—all of these were decisions
that hinged on how key political actors perceived the political costs of
accountability. Yet these three cases plainly fall on different sides of the
legal/political line. These political foundations of apex accountability explain
why concerns about litigiousness in deliberative politics can arise whether
accountability is grounded in a legal or a political home. Such political
foundations also render the politicization of rule-of-law institutions an
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unavoidable and permanent possibility, especially if the political cost of
violating a law is otherwise weak.54 In the U.S. system, for example, Congress
can always use the threat of defunding or the repealing of a prosecutorial
entity’s organic statute to influence the trajectory of investigations into official
conduct. Because Congress cannot credibly promise not to do so through any
legal means, its commitment to abstain from interference via fiscal mischief
necessarily rests on political grounds.
Although I am sympathetic to the idea that mere institutional
specification does little to change extant partisan incentives, I would be careful
not to press this leveling logic too far. Not all institutional formations are
equally vulnerable to political influences. It is possible to craft institutions that
are less rather than more sensitive to variance in political winds. But experience
suggests that this relative autonomy can exist on either side of the
legislative/executive divide. For example, it may be that the Congressional
Budget Office in practice is less “political,” in the sense of being responsive to
short-term political volatility, than the putatively independent Federal Reserve.
As Sarah Binder and Mark Spindel have recently documented, the Federal
Reserve in fact operates in a way that suggests close dependence upon
Congress.55 Hence, autonomy from transient politics may be feasible, but it is
not simply a matter of placing institutions in the right branch.
A second reason for insisting on separation at the branch level resists the
premise that accountability is a single task that can be neatly aligned with one or
the other branch of government. Notice that there are two separate tasks
entailed in accountability for apex criminality. The first is epistemic and
involves the investigation of allegations. The second is evaluative and entails a
determination of what consequences should flow from an investigation’s factual
findings. At first blush, the criterion of comparative institutional specialization
might suggest a bifurcation of these tasks between professional investigators and
political actors.56 For instance, investigation might be the obligation of
professional prosecutors, whereas legislators would evaluate and assign
punishment by creating ex ante schedules of penalties.
But I think we should be cautious in assuming the validity of such claims.
We should be more open to the possibility that competence is endogenous to
54.
55.
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constitutional design choices.
As a historical matter, congressional
investigations of executive malfeasance (which is a broader category than
criminality) have been frequent and effective in damaging presidents’ public
standing,57 even as Congress has generally been loath to impeach.58 This
historical pattern suggests that there is nothing inevitable about prosecutorial
comparative advantage in epistemic matters. The analysis is further complicated
by secular trends such as increasing partisan polarization within Congress and
a decaying rate of legislative investigation.59 One can reasonably take the view
that the appropriate response to the progressive deterioration of legislative
capacities for investigation and judgment is not accommodation. Rather, in a
Thayerian spirit, the best response might be to excise completely the moral
hazard created by a prosecutorial backstop, leaving Congress with sole
responsibility for both acquiring information and putting it to normative use.
Finally, it is worth recalling that the U.S.-style separation of functions
among distinct branches is a contingent constitutional design choice, and an
increasingly unpopular one at that.60 Many other polities work tolerably well
without that particular kind of institutional separation. In the United
Kingdom, for example, an important instrument of accountability is the
parliamentary commission of inquiry, an intermittent institution most often
revived in the wake of public crises for which legislators wish to avoid blame.61
Yet once up and running, these bodies appear to operate with a high degree of
independence from direct political control. This occurs despite the fact that
they remain technically within parliamentary control.62 This model suggests
that it is possible to create institutions, even ones that are intermittent in
character, that are legislative in terms of their institutional home, but that are
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still capable of exercising independent judgment in the pursuit of an
investigation into apex criminality.
All this is to say that the dispositional and motivational firewalling of
accountability mechanisms from political life so as to prevent both the diffusion
of litigiousness and the political capture of rule-of-law institutions can happen
in many ways, and need not be done at the branch level.
CONCLUSION
My aim in this short piece has been to map out some considerations that
most usefully inform the design of accountability mechanisms for apex
criminality. Having set forth some needful caveats as to whether it is really
worth the candle of constitutionalizing apex accountability devices, I have
suggested that the principal costs of such mechanisms sound in the ways they
can distort political culture. This conduces to separation as a remedy, although
I have cautioned against assuming that using the division of power into discrete
government branches is either necessary or sufficient to that end.
Instead, it may well be more useful to recognize that institutions that
preserve the quality of political life are themselves grounded largely on shared
understandings and dispositions. It depends on participants in a political
system having “the judgment to discern which issues are political” from
questions of law, and “respect for the structures and procedures that frame the
political enterprise” such that a participant will “resist[] the temptation
to . . . further his own aims by subverting the formalities it imposes.”63 Political
culture—the network of dispositions and incentives that form the wellsprings
of political action—hence may rest on institutions, but the health of those
institutions is a function not just of savvy design but also a persisting
commitment to the exercise of good judgment and a resistance to the
temptations to “subvert[]” whatever forms have been set forth. However
mediated and strengthened by institutional design democracy might be, this
implies the robustness of democratic institutions under the rule of law cannot
be disentangled from the character and motivations of those elected or
appointed to high office.
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